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Abstract 
This paper investigates the paradoxes inherent in Thai and Vietnamese drug policies. The two 
countries have much in common. Both are ultra-prohibitionist states which employ repressive policies 
to contain drug markets. Their policies have, however, diverged in two key areas: opium suppression 
and harm reduction. Thailand implemented an effective intervention to suppress opium farming 
centred upon alternative development, whereas Vietnam suppressed opium production through 
coercive negotiation with nominal alternative development. Vietnam has embraced elements of harm 
reduction, whereas Thailand has been slow to implement harm reduction policies. This paper 
hypothesises that these two differences are largely a product of their perceived relationship to security. 
The two cases demonstrate how once an issue is securitized the ultra-prohibitionist rules of the game 
can be broken to allow for more humane and pragmatic policies.  
 
Introduction 
This paper investigates the paradoxes inherent in Thai and Vietnamese drug policies. The two 
countries have much in common. Situated in close proximity to some of the world's largest sources of 
heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), their most widely consumed drugs are generally 
considered amongst the most harmful (Nutt et al., 2010).i Furthermore, the suppression of drug 
consumption and trade is high on both states agendas. Indeed, both could be described as ultra-
prohibitionist states which employ repressive policies that often contravene international human rights 
law.  
Vietnam has, however, started to overcome its punitive predisposition in the face of one of 
Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics to gradually introduce harm reduction policies;ii which have 
contributed to a reduction in HIV. Thailand, on the other hand, has been slow to implement harm 
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reduction practices. That is, Vietnam is moving towards a more effective and humane policy whereas 
Thailand continues to rely on less effective and more repressive policies aimed at forcing abstinence. 
Both are amongst a small number of states to have suppressed the illicit production of opium 
(see Windle, 2016). Thailand's zero tolerance approach to consumers and distributors is paradoxically 
dovetailed by its strong identity as a model of humane drug crop suppression through alternative 
development, supported by law enforcement.  The core of Vietnam's suppression effort, on the other 
hand, was coercive negotiation by the military with minimal support for alternative development. That 
is, Thailand implemented a humane policy, whereas Vietnam relied on more repressive policies aimed 
at the immediate cessation of opium farming.iii 
This paper will explore the similarities and differences between the two countries drug 
policies and provide a hypothesis on what led to such different routes. The paper begins by exploring 
the similarities between the two states in terms of national drug markets and, their overarching 
philosophies and drug policies. This is followed by an exploration into the two main differences: harm 
reduction and opium suppression. The concluding section employs the securitization model to develop 
a tentative hypothesis that security concerns have overshadowed drug concerns. That is, more humane 
policies have been implemented less for the benefit of consumers or farmers and more as a response 
to the non-traditional security threats of HIV, and the more traditional security threats of insurgency 
and border control. Importantly, the two cases demonstrate how once an issue is securitized the ultra-
prohibitionist rules of the game can be broken to allow for more humane policies: a process seldom 
documented in the literature. 
 
Similarities 
This section will explore three main similarities: ultra-prohibitionist philosophical foundation, HIV 
amongst people who inject drugs, and the use of compulsory treatment for drug users.  
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Philosophical foundation 
Combating drug consumption and smuggling continue to be high priorities for both Thailand and 
Vietnam (see Bangkok Post, 2014; Hayashi, 2013; Vuong et al., 2012; Windle, 2015, 2015b). Both 
states drug policies are founded upon conservative and zero-tolerance philosophies (Vuong et al., 
2012) that might by termed ultra-prohibitionist. Such policies receive strong support from the general 
public (Open Society, 2007; The Nation, 2014): as they do in other ultra-prohibitionist states such as 
China, Russia and the U.S. (see Levine, 2003; Zhang and Chin, 2015). Thai and Vietnamese societies 
are heavily influenced by philosophies / theologies which dictate that the individual should consider 
the needs of the country and family before their own: Communism and Confucianism in Vietnam, and 
Buddhism in Thailand. As such, perceived addicts 'have always been seen in a negative light as self-
indulged, selfish, and spoiled’ (Hayes-Larson et al., 2013:2). In fact, prohibitionist norms have much 
longer histories in the region than in either Europe or North America: due to the influence of 
Buddhism and Confucianism (Windle, 2014).  
Since the early-1990s Vietnam's official and publicly-stated view of illicit drugs has been that 
they are a ‘social evil’ to be eradicated (see Government of Vietnam, 1992: article 61). The 2000 Law 
on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs identified drugs as: 
 
... a major threat to the entire society, doing harm to human health, causing 
offspring degeneration, degrading human dignity, disrupting family happiness, and 
gravely affecting social order and safety and national security (Government of 
Vietnam, 2000). 
 
Vietnam has employed repressive policies to suppress this 'social evil': an estimated 700 
prisoners were on death row as of 2014, the majority for drug offences (The Telegraph, 2014). 
While Thailand calls for compassion towards drug users in its official drug control strategies 
(see ONCB, 2007) high level politicians have consistently demonised drug market participants. The 
abuses of the 2003 ‘War on Drugs’ - in which an estimated 2,819 people were killed (Human Rights 
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Watch, 2004) - were a direct result of political pronouncements. In one speech, for example, Prime 
Minister Thaksin stated: 
 
You must use iron fist against drugs traffickers and show them no mercy. Because 
drug traffickers are ruthless to our children, so being ruthless back to them is not a 
bad thing ... If there are deaths among traffickers, it is normal (cited in Human 
Rights Watch, 2009: no page). 
 
In 2008, the 'War on Drugs' was reinstated with Thailand's interior minister, Chalerm 
Yubamrung, stating that the crackdown would continue even if 'thousands of people have to die' (cited 
in Werb et al., 2009: no page). Then, in September 2014, armed police and army personnel conducted 
a door-to-door operation in which potential drug users were forced to take drug tests: 83 users and 22 
'small-time dealers' were arrested. The users were imprisoned in compulsory treatment centres 
(Bangkok Post, 2014).  
In summary, both Thai and Vietnamese drug policies are founded upon ultra-prohibitionist 
philosophies which demonise drug users and support zero tolerance approaches. The following 
section discusses a controversial consequence of this philosophical foundation: compulsory treatment 
centres. 
 
Compulsory treatment centres 
In Thailand and Vietnam, possession and consumption of illicit drugs can result in arrest and 
incarceration in compulsory treatment centres (Pearshouse, 2009; Vuong et al., 2012). In 2010, 
approximately 102,291 people were incarcerated in 98 compulsory treatment centres in Thailand 
(ONCB, 2011); approximately 24,155 were incarcerated in 123 centres in Vietnam (UNODC, 2011). 
Most are imprisoned for around three to six months in Thailand or a maximum of two years in 
Vietnam, although the detention period can be extended upon review. Treatment often centres upon 
intensive physical exercise, forced labour, vocational training, therapeutic community group 
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discussions and/or lectures demonising drugs (see Csete et al., 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2011; 
Pearshouse, 2009; States News Service, 2014; WHO, 2010). Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
is common (Human Rights Watch, 2011; also Pearshouse, 2009; WHO, 2010). As centres fail to 
address underlying psychological or social problems, relapse rates tend to be high (Tyndal, 2010; also 
Csete et al., 2011; UNODC, 2011, 2012). Furthermore, the threat of arrest and, subsequent 
imprisonment and forced detoxification in centres inflate risky injecting behaviour and prevents 
access to health care; including HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention (Pankonin et al., 2008; also 
Hayashi, 2013; Jardine et al., 2012; Kerr et al., 2014).  
Encouragingly, Vietnam has declared its intention to reduce the number of centres in its 2013 
Drug Rehabilitation Renovation Plan and increase resources for community-based voluntary 
treatment (Government of Vietnam, 2014; UNODC, 2012a). While Vietnam is attempting to fix the 
compulsory treatment system - rather than eliminate it altogether (see Thai News Service, 2014) - 
Thailand has made no moves towards reform. 
 
HIV amongst people who inject drugs 
While prevalence of HIV has dropped from its peak in the early-2000s (Government of Vietnam, 
2013), Vietnam continues to have one of Asia's fastest growing HIV rates (Tran, 2013). At the start of 
2014 an estimated 256,000 people - 0.26% of the general population aged over 15 - were living with 
HIV (Government of Vietnam, 2013). Injecting drug use is the primary means of contracting HIV: 
Approximately 60% of all new HIV cases are contracted through needle sharing (Zhang et al., 2014) 
and injecting drug use is rising (UNODC, 2014a).  
Thailand has been identified as a 'High Priority Country' by UNODC’s HIV Programme 
(UNODC, 2013). In 2013, there were an estimated 430,000 people – 1.1% of the general population - 
living with HIV (UNAIDS, 2014). While half what it was in the mid-1990s the prevalence rate 
remains amongst the highest in Southeast Asia (Avert, 2014). The decline in HIV transmissions have 
been attributed to extensive prevention and treatment campaigns. Thailand is often seen as a model 
amongst developing countries in the provision of antiretroviral therapy (Human Rights Watch and 
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Thai AIDS Treatment Action Group, 2007) and HIV prevention. For example, sexual transmission of 
HIV declined by over 80% between 1991 and 2001; largely due to information campaigns and 
condom distribution (Csete et al., 2011). The World Bank (2011:4) has referred to its antiretroviral 
programme as ‘the most progressive and comprehensive … in the region’ whilst noting that it is 
‘remarkable how poorly Thailand has responded to the HIV epidemic among injection drug users’.  
From 2010, however, the rate of decline began to slow and, is rising among young people and 
at risk groups (Government of Thailand, 2014; UNICEF, 2014): including people who inject drugs. 
And intravenous drug use is rising; especially in southern provinces (Malikaew, 2014). While unsafe 
sex remains the primary means of contracting HIV in Thailand, intravenous drug use is a significant 
mode of transmission (Government of Thailand, 2014): in 2012, the Thai Government estimated that 
25.2% of people who inject drugs were living with HIV (Government of Thailand, 2014). And in 
2009, the government estimated that 40,300 people had injected drugs (UNODC, 2014a); an 
alternative estimate, however, places the number closer to 97,300 (MacDonald & Nacapew, 2013).  
 
Differences 
The previous section has shown how Thailand and Vietnam are similar in a number of ways. Their 
most heavily consumed drugs are often considered amongst the most harmful to the individual and 
society. Both have been heavily impacted by HIV. Both are conservative in their approach towards 
illicit drugs, and focus much of their resources on, often repressive, law enforcement and compulsory 
treatment centres. This section will draw out two main differences: harm reduction and illicit opium 
suppression.  
 
Harm reduction in Vietnam 
From around 2005, the HIV epidemic slowly shifted the ruling Communist Party’s perception of the 
drug problem. Many Communist Party leaders identified the unintended consequences of repressive 
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law enforcement and became ‘strong proponents’ of harm reduction (Vuong et al., 2012: 322). The 
2006 Law on AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control emphasized: 
 
… encouragement of the use of ... clean syringes and needles, treatment of 
addiction to opium-related substances with substitute substances and other harm 
reduction intervention measures (Government of Vietnam, 2006).  
 
The 2014 Plan for Socio-Economic Development called for scaling up of methadone maintenance and 
voluntary treatment services (State News Service, 2014) while the 2000 Law on Preventing and 
Combating Narcotic Drugs was amended in 2008 to provide support for the harm reduction measures 
proscribed in the Law on AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control. In 2009, the Penal Code was amended to 
characterize drug users as patients rather than criminals (Vuong et al., 2012). 
Pilot methadone maintenance programmes - administered between 1997 and 2002 - were 
considered successful in reducing HIV and acquisitive crime and, improving the health of users and 
general public. Rolled-out nationally in 2008, methadone maintenance programs expanded and by 
early-2014 were available to 15,542 patients across 80 sites in 30 provinces and cities. The 
government has committed to expanding methadone access to 80,000 drug users by 2015 
(Government of Vietnam, 2014; also Cates, 2013).  
Vietnam runs needle exchange programs in most provinces. In 2012, it distributed 180 
needles/syringes per injecting user (Government of Vietnam, 2014). While 180 needles per user is 
above the Asian regional median of 116, it remains below the UNAIDS recommendation of 200 
(UNAIDS, 2014); although 12 of Vietnams 32 provinces have reached UNAIDS target (Zhang et al., 
2014). The national ratio unfortunately dropped to 98 per injecting user in 2013 (Government of 
Vietnam, 2014). This reduction likely represents the end of funding for needle exchange programmes 
by the World Bank and UK Department for Foreign Development (DFID) in 2012 (Windle, 2015). 
Improved access to clean needles has reduced needle-sharing in many areas. Twenty six of 32 
provinces in which DFID and the World Bank administered needle exchange programs witnessed a 
decline in HIV prevalence, no province reported a growth in HIV prevalence, and the project 
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prevented an estimated 26,822 HIV infections (Zhang et al., 2014). Overall, the introduction of harm 
reduction programmes have contributed to a reduction in the HIV rate among people who inject drugs 
from 30% in the mid-1990s to 11.6% in 2013 (IRIN, 2014; also Nguyen & Scannapieco, 2008).  
Significant challenges and barriers to effective harm reduction remain. The Ordinance on 
Administrative Violations continues to categorise drug use as an administrative violation and, users are 
still frequently imprisoned in compulsory drug treatment centres (Vuong et al., 2012). The uniform 
and discriminatory attitudes of medical professionals in Vietnam and abusive police practices 
represent additional barriers. The prevalent police culture views forced detoxification as the only 
means of reducing the perceived threat drug users pose to society. Indeed, local police use harm 
reduction programs as mechanisms for identifying drug users and, the harassment and arrest of harm 
reduction workers is common (Hammett et al., 2008; Jardine et al., 2012; Windle, 2015b). 
Attitudes among some in the Vietnamese police may be changing. For example, Lieutenant 
Colonel Lam Tien Dung of the People's Police Academy, stated at the 2014 International AIDS 
Conference that: 
 
Harm reduction approaches to HIV prevention among … drugs users have been 
scientifically proven by public health experts, but cannot be successful without the 
active participation of law enforcement … We used to think of these people as our 
targets, but now we see them as our partners. By working with HIV experts to 
develop strong police practices grounded in public health and human rights, we 
can help control the spread of HIV (States News Service, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the Vietnamese Communist Party used the 2014 World Drug Day to appeal for an end to 
the stigmatisation and discrimination of drug users (UNODC, 2014b). In short, while there remain 
barriers, partly attributable to entrenched cultural norms, Vietnam is moving towards a more harm 
reductionist position; even if it is some way off a wider national policy designed around harm 
reduction principles of pragmatism, humanistic values and a focus on harms (Hunt et al., 2003).  
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Harm reduction in Thailand 
Thailand has been slow to implement harm reduction practices.iv Those that have been implemented 
have focused upon injecting heroin users, even though yaa baa - Thailand’s most popular illicit drug - 
is most commonly eaten or smoked. Indeed, there are few harm reduction services directed 
specifically at consumers of amphetamine-type stimulants: a situation common to many countries 
(Barrett et al., 2010; see Pinkham & Stone, 2015).v  
Thailand’s coverage of clean needles is one of the lowest in Asia. In 2013 it distributed just 
12.02 sets of needles per user; up from 9.79 in 2011 (Government of Thailand, 2014; also WHO, 
2010). This is significantly lower than the Asian median of 116, the Vietnamese rate of 180 and 
UNAIDS recommended minimum of 200 (UNAIDS, 2014). Furthermore, there are very few needle 
exchanges: just 38 sites operated in 2013, down from 49 in 2010. The majority were based in 
Bangkok (Government of Thailand, 2014; also WHO, 2010).  
While methadone has been available for substitution therapy since 2000, treatment coverage 
has historically been low and largely limited to Bangkok (Fairbairn et al., 2012). Nonetheless, some 
pilot projects have been initiated in remote areas of northern Thailand and coverage is increasing. In 
2013, there were 147 sites providing substitution therapy, up from 49 in 2009 (Government of 
Thailand, 2014). The majority of methadone is provided to assist detoxification over 45-to-90 day 
programmes: long-term methadone maintenance can only be prescribed after three failed attempts at 
abstinence. Furthermore, the lack of state subsidization makes it expensive (Fairbairn et al., 2012).  
There are a number of barriers to accessing needle exchanges and substitution therapy. First, 
drug consumption remains a crime and the distribution of needles has been interpreted as promoting 
drug use.vi Second, as health care providers often hold negative attitudes to people who inject drugs, 
many are slow to promote needles exchanges (Government of Thailand, 2014; Chan et al., 2008): 
which are often viewed as ‘immoral’, ‘not Thai’ or ‘encouraging drug use’ (Human Rights Watch and 
Thai Aids Treatment Action Group, 2007). Third, there tends to be a high police presence, and 
harassment of consumers and workers at treatment and harm reduction sites: 25.5% of a sample of 
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435 people who inject drugs reported avoiding healthcare due to the threat of compulsory treatment 
(Kerr et al., 2014).  
Human rights groups have identified widespread use of cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment of individuals during arrest, pre-trail detention and incarceration. For example, 37% of a 
sample of 639 people who inject drugs in Bangkok reported being beaten or, less often, tortured by 
the police; often to coerce them into admitting false charges. In addition, extrajudicial killings by the 
police during the 2003 'War on Drugs' instilled a fear that is hard to shake off (Hayashi, 2013; also 
Tyndal, 2010). While the harassment of drug users and harm reduction workers parallels the 
experience of Vietnam, the impetus to change evident in Vietnam is missing from Thailand.  
Drug crop suppression in Vietnam 
There is a long tradition of opium production in Vietnam by some ethnic groups, who have cultivated 
opium poppies since migrating to the highlands from China in the early/mid-19th century (Culas & 
Michaud, 1997). In 1975, the government began procuring highland opium for domestic and export 
medicinal purposes. While the state stopped buying highland opium in 1985, those who had been 
selling to the state continued producing opium: the majority was sold on the black market (Boonwaat, 
2001). Opium production was, however, tolerated until prohibited in 1992; amidst concerns over 
rising domestic opium and heroin consumption (Rapin et al., 2003).  
Crop substitution projects were established in the early-1990s. These state administered 
projects centred on contracts whereby the state agreed to compensate individual farmers or provide 
rural development in exchange for the immediate cessation of opium farming. While drug control was 
later mainstreamed into national highland development programmes, the level of development support 
remained spotty, sporadic, and considerably lower than in lowland areas (Windle, 2012b).   
Indeed, the core of the opium suppression effort was ‘coercive negotiations’ (Windle, 2012b). 
From 1992, the official policy was to immediately eradicate opium poppies. So-called ‘negotiated 
eradication’ would begin with the distribution of propaganda on the harm of opium and promises of 
rural development assistance. Negotiations with farmers were conducted by the military. While the 
presence of the military implied coercion, reports also emerged that soldiers regularly threatened 
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farmers to implement eradication. Other reports of widespread human rights abuses of highland 
peoples at the hands of the military and police may suggest that the intervention was far more 
repressive than is publicly acknowledged (Windle, 2012b). This said, arrest and prosecution were 
officially reserved for systematic re-cultivation (Chapon, 1992; Rapin et al., 2003). Farmers were, 
however, ‘administratively punished’. For example, farmers could be placed under increased 
surveillance or ordered to live (possible under house arrest) and work in specified areas (US State 
Department, 1999). 
Coercive negotiations did effectively wipe out opium production. Within a decade, Vietnam 
went from being designated a significant source of opium to having essentially eliminated production 
(Windle, 2012b). The intervention, however, worsened opium farmers living conditions, forcing many 
to sell land and/or migrate (Corlin, 2004; Windle, 2012b). In some highland areas, an emerging 
tourism industry represented the only alternative income for opium farmers (Michaud & Turner, 
2000). 
 
Drug crop suppression in Thailand 
Like Vietnam, Thailand succeeded in suppressing opium production in the early-2000s; after decades 
of cultivation. Where the two differ is that Thai opium suppression – after learning from early policy 
misunderstandings, mistakes and experiments (Renard, 2009) - centred primarily on alternative 
development which addressed the structural drivers of opium farming; supported by law enforcement 
sequenced after state extension and the resolution of the highland insurgency (Windle, 2015b, 2016).  
Opium production in Thailand remained a cottage industry until the 1950s (Morlock, 1944) 
when traditional producers of opium living across Southeast Asia responded to a gap in the global 
market created by the removal of three of the world’s largest sources of illicit opium: China, India and 
Iran (McCoy, 2003; Renard, 2001).vii While production was officially prohibited in 1959 a 
combination of weak authority and high-level connivance with the opiate trade facilitated an increase 
in production; peaking in 1970 at 200 metric tons over 10,000 hectares (Windle, 2016).  
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Between 1960 and 1968 the Thai military employed repressive law enforcement techniques 
against opium farmers in areas with high communist insurgent activity. As law enforcement 
represented a means of strangling the insurgent’s financial resources this early intervention centred 
upon forced eradication; including napalming villages and planting landmines in poppy fields 
(Economist, 1969; Kanjan & Kaewchote, 2004). While increased risk, manufactured by military 
force, reduced production in some areas the intervention pushed farmers deeper into poverty and 
further away from the state (Renard, 2001).  
By 1968, politicians began to see coercion as counterproductive to counterinsurgency 
objectives (Economist, 1969; Marks, 1973). As such, Thailand began administering limited 
development aid and constructing roads to expose the highlands. Then, in 1969, King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej initiated a highland development project with the primary objective of improving the 
welfare of highland opium farmers; a joint Thai-UN administered project followed in 1971. These two 
early projects established a foundation of knowledge of highland issues and agriculture, best practice 
in administrating highland development and, mutual trust between the state and isolated highland 
peoples. A number of development projects were administered from the 1970s that brought modern 
agriculture, market access and social goods to highland communities (Windle, 2016).  
In order to allow space for rural development, laws prohibiting opium were seldom enforced 
before 1983. After which, law enforcement centred crop eradication only once farmers had access to 
alternative livelihoods. The arrest and punishment of farmers remained minimal throughout the 
intervention (Renard, 2001). The majority of eradication was negotiated (Chotpimai, 1987) and 
centred upon the use of levers, such as offering favourable treatment when applying for Thai 
citizenship (Renard, 2001). As schedules of development/eradication were often negotiated with 
communities at the beginning of development projects, communities tended to be pre-warned of 
forced eradication; sometimes years in advance (Lee, 1994). All eradication, whether forced or 
voluntary, tended to be humane (Lee, 1994; Renard, 2001) and few farmers were arrested or punished 
for production (DEA, 1992). To avoid impoverishing farmers the Thai Army supplied basic 
emergency relief after the first eradication (Chotpimai, 1987).  
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In 1999, the U.S. Department of State (1999) removed Thailand from its major drug 
producers list and UNODC (2009) declared Thailand ‘poppy-free’ in 2002. Between the peak of 
production in 1970 and 2010, production declined by 98%. Overall, the intervention had a positive 
impact on opium farming communities in terms of economic development and access to social goods 
(Windle, 2016). 
 
Discussion 
This paper has shown how two countries with very similar philosophies, policies and practices 
towards drugs and, drug users and sellers can take very different paths on specific elements of drug 
policy, in this case harm reduction and drug crop suppression. This section will provide a tentative 
hypothesis regarding the choices made:  Security trumps drug control.  
By this we mean that policies to counter opium production in Thailand, and HIV linked to 
intravenous drug use in Vietnam, followed the securitization process first proposed by Wæver (1995), 
and developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). During the securitization process an actor or 
actors - whether government, NGO or media - perform a ‘speech act’ in which an issue is presented as 
an existential threat which requires moving 'beyond the rules of the game' (Buzan et al., 1998:23). The 
word security does not necessarily have to be used in the speech: words the audience may link to 
security can suffice (i.e. defence, threat, war). To become securitized the audience must accept the 
issue as a security threat. Securitizing the issue in this way elevates it and permits the state to break its 
own norms of behaviour (Buzan et al., 1998), and may result in the reformulation of new norms 
(Abrahamsen, 2005). While securitization often increases coercive responses – such as war, intrusive 
surveillance or state terrorism (Abrahamsen, 2005) - the securitization processes in Thailand and 
Vietnam resulted in less repressive actions by breaking established ultra-prohibitionist norms.  
While drug policy in Southeast Asia tends to be motivated by a mixture of morality and crime 
control (see Amon et al., 2014), the public health and criminal justice concerns around drug use and 
distribution can be securitized. The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) has provided a 
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number of speech acts presenting drugs as an existential threat. For example, the Joint-Declaration 
for a Drug-Free ASEAN – signed by Thailand and Vietnam – states: 
 
 … the illicit drug trade … could escalate to such a level where perpetrators can 
pose serious political and security threats to the region (ASEAN, 1998: preamble, 
italics added) 
 
The ASEAN Leaders Declaration on a Drug-Free ASEAN - signed by the leaders of Thailand 
and Vietnam at a meeting in Bangkok – agreed: 
 
… the international drug  problem remains one of the main security concerns to all 
ASEAN Member States… illicit drug abuse and trafficking weaken the social 
fabric of nations, represent direct and indirect economic costs to governments and 
entail criminal activities which could threaten the stability of states…  (ASEAN, 
2012: preamble, italics added). 
 
The securitization of drug policy often results in more militaristic or repressive measures; 
often causing significant negative consequence (Crick, 2012). Examples include, Thaksin’s 'War on 
Drugs' in Thailand, Widodo’s ‘state of emergency’ on drugs in Indonesia (see Stoicescu & Burke-
Shyne, 2015) and the current militarisation of policing in Russia (Galeotti, 2015). Drug control can 
also, however, be undermined by more traditional security concerns. For example, the U.S. facilitated 
the production and distribution of illicit drugs to fulfil security objectives in Southeast Asia during the 
Vietnam War (see McCoy, 2003). Thailand followed a similar path until the 1970s. During the 1950s 
the Thai military developed a symbiotic relationship with anti-communist insurgent groups engaged in 
heroin manufacturing and distribution along the Thai-Burmese border. The goal of the relationship 
was to establish a buffer zone against Burma and weaken the Burmese Government. By the late-
1970s, however, the Thai Government began viewing their client insurgents as a threat to state 
authority in border areas. Consequently, in the early-1980s, the military ejected the insurgents from 
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Thai territory through aerial bombings, military assaults and intensified interdiction of heroin 
laboratories along the Thai-Burmese border (see McCoy, 2003; Windle, 2016). The cases of opium 
suppression in Thailand and HIV in Vietnam, however, suggest securitization as a process of 
implementing more humane policies which break ultra-prohibitionist norms.  
Between the early-1960s and early-1980s Thailand experienced a communist insurgency in 
the northern highlands. The politics of the Cold War meant that Thailand came under significant 
external pressure to suppress the insurgency, and became the recipient of considerable military aid 
(Girling, 1967). Furthermore, there was ‘an atmosphere of panic’ within the Thai Government and 
military (Handley, 2006: 185) that the insurgents could further destabilise areas bordering antagonistic 
neighbouring states, some of whom were communist. That is, the civilian government, military and 
foreign allies identified the insurgency and lack of control over the highlands as a major security 
threat (see Handley, 2006; McCoy, 2003; Thomas, 1986). 
As such, during the 1960s, Thailand attempted to forcefully eradicate opium cultivated in the 
northern highlands; partly to remove funds from insurgent coffers. Officials based in northern 
provinces and the Border Patrol Police, however, soon realised that opium suppression pushed 
farmers towards insurgents in strategically important border areas (Economist, 1969; Campbell, 
1983). Morey (2014:73), for example, recalls the Thai Defence Minister telling King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej how violent attempts to end the highland insurgency had failed. The King told the General 
that the insurgency could be ended by developing rural areas and, providing healthcare and education. 
This dovetailed a growing identification that most insurgents were motivated not by ideology, but by 
the material support promised by communist agents (Girling, 1967), and that some local conflicts 
were a direct result of opium suppression (Culas & Michaud, 1997). The King became a key 
proponent of development as a means of suppressing both opium production and the insurgency. He 
used securitizing speech acts to advocate this policy: 
 
Attempts should be made to bring over the people to our side so that they will not 
join [the communists] … We must firstly provide protection and assistance to them 
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in various ways, and this is the policy to push back the terrorists (cited in 
Grossman & Faulder, 2012: 240). 
 
People who are hungry and sick are receiving help from people who are ... 
terrorists. So we have to give help immediately (cited in Grossman & Faulder, 
2012: 247). 
 
Many are driven into becoming insurgents by force of circumstance … It is up to 
officials in rural areas to perform their duty with caution, justice, consciousness 
and greater sacrifice. Otherwise we have to concede victory to the insurgents (cited 
in Handley, 2006: 199). 
 
 These thoughts translated into policy when Prime Minister Tinsulanonda issued two policy 
guidelines (Order no. 66/2523 and 65/2525) stressing development as more effective than military 
force in suppressing the insurgency. The policy was based upon the ‘assumption that such 
development would undercut popular support for the insurgents and also provide a rationale for many 
insurgents to defect’ (Thomas, 1986: 21).  
Linked to the insurgency, Thailand sought to extend state authority into highland areas, and 
realised that removing an important key cash crop pushed highland peoples away from the state; 
whereas rural development would build political capital with isolated highland peoples. That is, by the 
early-1970s Thailand came to view development as useful in extending the state whilst reducing the 
insurgent support base and suppressing a prohibited drug crop (see Renard, 2001; Windle, 2016).  
Vietnam, on the other hand, had extended its authority over highland opium farming 
communities and suppressed highland insurgencies decades before it had attempted to suppress opium 
production. In fact, the continual abuse of highland minorities by the Vietnamese Government (Home 
Office, 2014) had not destabilised the highlands. That is, as it did not need development to extend the 
state it was free to use more coercive methods (Windle, 2012, 2016) which conformed to Vietnams 
zero-tolerance approach.  
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In summary, when repressive drug crop suppression conflicted with Thailand's security 
agenda it was replaced with a more humane development-orientated approach. Whereas, the stability 
of the Vietnamese highlands meant that the government could quickly suppress opium using coercive 
means, without igniting a security risk.  
In terms of harm reduction it appears that Vietnam identified HIV as a threat to national 
security. The linkage between HIV and security is founded upon the fear that HIV within the military 
could reduce military power, and that high HIV rates amongst the general population could eventually 
result in state collapse; which could, in turn, facilitate more traditional security threats. It’s a 
perception held by many governments, and one promoted by the U.S. since the 1980s (Barnett, 2008; 
de Waal, 2010). For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1308 states: ‘the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security’ (UN Security Council, 2000). While, in 2000, 
James Wolfensohn, the former president of the World Bank, called HIV the greatest ‘challenge to 
peace and stability in African societies … We face a ... a security crisis’ (cited in Ancker, 2007:34). 
Premier Wen of China stated in 2004 that HIV ‘has great bearing on the strength of the Chinese nation 
and the fate of the country’ (cited in Morey, 2014:176).  
The security / HIV link has been contested by academics (see Barnett, 2008; Fourie, 2007; for 
support see Ancker, 2007; McInnes & Rushton, 2010; Singer, 2002). Evidence is not, however, 
necessary for policy (Monaghan, 2011) and ‘governance outcomes have been shaped as much by the 
perception of HIV/AIDS as a security threat, as the actual impacts of the epidemic’ (de Waal, 
2010:114). The linkage promoted by the Security Council was influential. It resulted in the formation 
of: a UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in 2001; the G8 Global Fund to Fight 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002; and the President’s Plan for Emergency AIDS Relief in 
2003. The U.S. military continue to invest heavily in the development of a HIV vaccine (McInnes & 
Rushton, 2010). That is, while the link may have been overstated, re-labelling HIV a security threat 
elevated it as a priority policy area on the international stage. 
The international bodies created to contain the security threat of HIV all worked in Vietnam 
during the late-1990s/2000s, and likely influenced the perception of HIV as a security threat. In fact, a 
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turning point in Vietnamese policy was when the Vice Prime Minister attended a UNDP sponsored 
conference. One participant recalls how a Thai speaker: 
 
… talked about how devastating AIDS was in the Thai military, and on hearing 
this, the Vietnamese Vice Prime Minister sent his aid out to make a call to a 
general to attend the conference and talk to Mechai [the speaker a, Thai Cabinet 
Minister] (Morey, 2014:218). 
 
A UNDP delegate then told the conference ‘Vietnam has fought many wars in its history, but 
the war against HIV/AIDS could be the most challenging of all’. The Vice Prime Minister went on to 
become the head of Vietnams National AIDS Task Force (Morey, 2014:218, italics added) and a key 
proponent of harm reduction.  
Vietnam has linked drugs to HIV and security by referring to drugs as 'creating bad effects on 
society’s culture, public security and contributing to the spread of HIV' (cited in Ha et al., 2010, italics 
added). The opening paragraph of Prime Ministers Decision 36/2004/QD-TTG represents a 
securitizing speech act presenting HIV as an existential threat: 
 
HIV/AIDS is a dangerous epidemic, threatening people’s health and life and the 
future generations of the nation. HIV/AIDS directly affects the country’s economic 
and cultural development, social order and safety (Government of Vietnam, 2004: 
1, italics added). 
 
Indeed, this is reflected in Vietnam’s 2004 National Strategy on HIV/AIDS Prevention which 
states: ‘HIV/AIDS … undermines security, development and the human race’ (Government of 
Vietnam 2004:12, italics added). 
Why then did Thailand not roll out harm reduction policies, when it too had a significant HIV 
population? The answer may lie in the drugs of choice and modes of ingestion. Vietnam's most widely 
consumed drug is heroin, intravenous use is the most common mode of ingestion, and the HIV 
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epidemic is concentrated around people who inject drugs (Ha et al., 2010; Open Society, 2007). 
Whereas, Thailand's most widely consumed drug is yaa baa, which is mostly smoked or swallowed; 
although there is a significant injecting population (see Hayashi et al., 2011; UNODC, 2011, 2015). 
Furthermore, Thailand was able to significantly reduce the number of people infected with HIV 
through extensive prevention and treatment campaigns without implementing harm reduction. It may 
be significant that by the mid-1990s Thailand had already made impressive reductions in HIV rates 
within the military (Rojanapithayakorn & Hanenberg, 1996).   
It may be that once HIV was labelled a security risk in Vietnam, the state was able to break its 
ultra-prohibitionist norms. Alternatively, as the number of injecting drug users was lower in Thailand, 
and Thai policy had so far contained the threat without including people who inject drugs, it did not 
have to reassesses its underlying ultra-prohibitionist philosophy.  
Herrington (2010) has argued that HIV was not securitized in Vietnam as the state pushed for 
more social, rather than coercive, means to contain the issue. Coercion is not, however, a prerequisite 
of securitization: breaking of norms of behaviour is enough. In this case harm reduction broke zero 
tolerance policies founded upon an ultra-prohibitionist philosophy; as did development-orientated 
opium suppression in Thailand. Furthermore, as Abrahamsen (2005) and McInnes and Rushton (2010) 
have argued, security and normal politics are not binary positions but rather represent ends of the 
spectrum: HIV and opium may have been partly securitized.  
This all said, the policy process is messy and complex, and seldom limited to one 
consideration, no matter how influential (Lancaster et al., 2014). Thai HIV policy was, for example, 
influenced by a strong and active civil society who sought to tackle the disease because of the harm 
caused to individuals and communities (Lyttleton, 2008); not because it was a security threat. The 
Kings labelling of rural development in opium farming areas as a response to a security threat was 
additionally motivated by his compassion for opium farmers (Grossman & Faulder, 2012; Morey, 
2014). Conversely, public opinion can also be a significant driver of policy. And tough drug policy is 
popular in Thailand and Vietnam.  
In short, policy is not always arrived at through rational processes that weigh up costs and 
benefits (Monaghan, 2011). Rather policy is often an outcome of years or decades of institutional 
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learning (Windle, 2013) and interaction between bureaucratic, economic and moral entrepreneurs with 
different and conflicting objectives (Windle, 2014). That may be, however, until the problem is 
securitised. For once labelled a security threat the state must act immediately: to fail to do so could 
threaten the very existence of a thing of great importance and, as such, necessitates the overcoming of 
norms of behaviour (Buzan et al., 1998). That is, popular ultra-prohibitionist norms were broke in 
response to the perceived security threats of HIV in Vietnam and highland insurgency in Thailand.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated how two countries with similar ultra-prohibitionist foundations took 
different paths regarding harm reduction and drug crop suppression. Thailand implemented a humane 
drug crop suppression intervention, and a repressive policy against consumers which largely ignored 
harm reduction. Vietnam has begun to implement harm reduction practices, yet its drug crop 
suppression intervention was repressive.   
It can be difficult to uncover what motivates governments to formulate policy, especially 
former communist states (Ha et al., 2010; Vuong et al., 2012). It has, however, been suggested that 
labelling specific drug policy issue security threats resulted in significant policy change that went 
against established drug policy norms.  
Thailand and Vietnam took very different approaches to opium suppression and the 
differences were largely guided by security concerns. Thailand broke its own ultra-prohibitionist 
norms when repressive drug crop suppression began inflating the insurgency and destabilising border 
areas. Vietnam, on the other hand, had already extended its authority over highland opium farming 
communities and suppressed highland insurgencies, so was free to use more coercive means.  
While both Thailand and Vietnam identified HIV as a security threat, Thailand reduced the 
threat without changing its underlying philosophy. The high level of intravenous drug consumption in 
Vietnam, however, forced the Vietnamese Government to accept harm reduction as useful for 
reducing the perceived security threat of HIV.  
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That is, the speech acts of implying intravenous drugs use and HIV and, opium cultivation 
and insurgency, as security threats necessitated the breaking of the rules of the ultra-prohibitionist 
game. These two case, furthermore, demonstrate how securitization is not binary and does not 
necessarily end in the use of force. The ‘rules of the game’ were indeed broke; but broke in a more 
positive way which resulted in more humane policy. 
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i The most widely consumed drugs are heroin (Vietnam) and yaa baa (Thailand; methamphetamine pills cut 
with caffeine), although crystal methamphetamine consumption is rising in both states (see UNODC, 2015; 
Windle, 2015b, 2015b). For a discussion on the harms associated with methamphetamine and heroin 
consumption see Roxburgh et al. (2013). 
ii Harm reduction here: 
… refers to policies, programmes and practices that aim primarily to reduce the adverse 
health, social and economic consequences of the use of legal and illegal psychoactive 
drugs without necessarily reducing drug consumption (HRI, 2015: no page).  
iii While this paper refers to the Thai intervention as humane, this is not to imply that it followed harm reduction 
principles. Such a conceptual discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, however, as reducing harm was not 
the interventions primary goal it may be difficult to conceptualise it as harm reduction (see Lenton and Single, 
1998). 
iv A pilot harm reduction strategy, launched in February 2014, stalled after the 2014 military coup. If 
implemented it would have supported the distribution of clean needles and coordinated the administration of 
harm reduction with civil society (IDPC, 2014). 
v Nationally it is more common to eat or smoke yaa baa pills (UNODC, 2015; World Bank, 2010). There are, 
however, relatively large methamphetamine injecting populations in some areas (Barrett et al., 2010; 
Hayashi et al. 2011; UNODC, 2011), including ‘poly-drug users who continue to inject, inhale, and ingest a 
range of illegal drugs’ (World Bank, 2010: 5).  
See Pinkham and Stone (2015) for a discussion on the range of strategies available for amphetamine consumers.   
vi In 2010 the Council of State declared that needle exchanges promote drug use, and are thus inconsistent with 
Thai drug control law. The ruling forced Prime Minister Vejjajiva to abandon plans for a national harm reduction 
strategy. 
vii During the 1950s China and Iran suppressed the production of opium (Windle, 2016). India strengthened its 
control over regulated opium production and exportation for the pharmaceutical industry and, although 
diversion from the state monopoly means that India currently remains one of the world’s largest sources of 
illicit opium, very little exported (Windle, 2012a).  
